We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we …nd that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also …nd that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing e¤ect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents a¤ects Veto's welfare properties.
Introduction
In many sensitive situations, group decisions are required to be unanimous. Examples include a number of international organizations that would not exist without granting some sort of veto power to their members. 1 They also include partnerships and other unlimited liability companies, and criminal trials by jury in the US. The central question in this paper is: what voting system is best in such situations?
When agents have no uncertainty about their preferred alternative, all unanimous rules are equivalent -a proposal to reform the status quo is only accepted if it is Pareto improving (Wicksell 1967 (Wicksell [1896 and Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Unanimous rules are, however, not equivalent when agents are uncertain about the merits of a proposal and share common objectives. This is because voting then ought to aggregate the information dispersed among agents. The problem is that unanimous decision making is believed to aggregate information poorly Pesendorfer 1998, Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey 2000) . 2 This raises the question of whether a group necessarily sacri…ces information aggregation when it grants veto power to its members.
In this paper, we compare the performance, in the laboratory, of two of the most widely used unanimous rules: unanimity rule and majority rule with veto power (henceforth Unanimity and Veto). 3 Under Unanimity, agents must consent or dissent. The reform is then adopted if and only if no one dissents. Under Veto, agents can consent, dissent, or veto. The proposal is then accepted provided that no one vetoes and a (simple or quali…ed) majority consents. The main di¤erence is that under Unanimity agents cannot convey negative information about the reform without blocking it altogether. The intense debate during the early years of the United Nations Security Council on the impossibility of dissenting without vetoing illustrates that this di¤erence is far from innocuous (Sievers and Daws 2014) .
And indeed, we …nd that, in contrast to Unanimity, Veto consistently aggregates infor- 1 See, e.g., Zamora (1980) , Posner and Sykes (2014) , and Maggi and Morelli (2006) ; and Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe (2016) for a discussion. 2 Coughlan (2001), Duggan and Martinelli (2001) , Persico (2004) , and Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe (2016), however, highlight cases where unanimous decision making features good information aggregation properties. 3 Among international organizations Unanimity is used, e.g., by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Council (for most sensitive topics, excluding Common Foreign and Security Policy), and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). In contrast, Veto (or a close variation) is used, e.g., by the European Council (for the Common Foreign and Security Policy), the United Nations Security Council. mation well in the laboratory. Hence, our …ndings provide empirical support to our previous theoretical result that Veto Pareto dominates Unanimity (Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe 2016). This provides a rationale for the use of Veto in practice and sheds light on the evolution of decision-making practices in the United Nations Security Council and the Council of the European Union. It also suggests that it would be bene…cial for voting bodies that currently use Unanimity to adopt Veto instead.
Our experiment design follows the typical setup considered in the information aggregation voting literature. There are two possible states of the world (Red or Blue). Agents observe a binary private signal (red or blue) that is correlated with the realized state.
They have a common objective: they are all rewarded if the group decision (Red or Blue) matches the state (decision Red represents the status quo). To make the group decision, they hold a simultaneous vote according to a pre-speci…ed voting system: Unanimity or Veto.
Theoretically, the welfare performance of these voting rules depends on the information structure. To understand this idea, note that under both rules, any single agent can enforce the status quo. If the red signal is su¢ ciently informative relative to the blue signal, enforcing the status quo when observing a red signal is a weakly dominant strategy. In this case, where the red signal is decisive, information aggregation is relatively straightforward and both Veto and Unanimity are e¢ cient. When the red signal is not decisive, however, information aggregation is a more subtle problem and Veto outperforms Unanimity because it o¤ers the possibility of revealing a negative signal without pinning down the outcome.
We consider both cases in the laboratory. First, in the case where a red signal is not decisive, we use equally informative signals as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) . We …nd that groups using Veto make about a third the number of mistakes as those who use Unanimity. This di¤erence is due to a dramatic reduction of type II errors. That is, using Veto makes it much less likely that agents will reject a good reform (or in the typical jury interpretation, acquit a guilty defendant). In the case where a red signal is decisive, we …nd that performances under Veto and Unanimity do not di¤er signi…cantly. Our data therefore provides strong empirical support for the theoretical predictions.
We then analyze subject behavior in detail. This is important because, unless we can convince ourselves that the model is a su¢ ciently good predictor of subject behavior, we can hardly extrapolate our welfare results to variations in group size and information structure, for instance, let alone draw policy implications. Overall, despite some heterogeneity, we …nd that the model predicts aggregate behavior fairly well.
Finally, to inform the comparison between Unanimity and Veto, we run control treatments with two alternative voting rules: simple majority rule (henceforth Majority) and unanimity rule under the constructive abstention regime (henceforth Constructive Abstention). Beyond being a standard benchmark in the literature, the Majority treatments are useful to assess the consequences of equilibrium multiplicity under Veto. Constructive Abstention is strategically equivalent to Veto but changes actions' focality. We exploit this framing di¤erence to study the sensitivity of Veto's welfare properties to the presence of less sophisticated agents.
Related Literature
Our paper is the …rst to compare the information aggregation properties of di¤erent unanimous voting rules in the laboratory.
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) documents evidence of strategic voting
under Unanimity in the Condorcet Jury setup. They show that, in line with theoretical predictions, subjects vote against their signal and that this improves information aggregation with respect to sincere voting. Goeree and Yariv (2011) also …nd evidence of strategic voting. In addition, they …nd that allowing for communication among agents before the vote substantially reduces the impact a voting rule has on the group decision, even when theory predicts that it should not be the case. 4 Our paper contributes to this literature in at least two ways. First, and most importantly, we expand the set of unanimous rules beyond Unanimity by considering Veto and Constructive Abstention. Second, we consider information structures (i.e. the case where the red signal is decisive) for which unanimous rules are optimal mechanisms. 5 4 Other recent papers on information aggregation in committees include Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey (2010), Morton In this literature, veto rights constrain the set of implementable policies. In common-value environments such as ours, agents do not use veto for their purely private bene…t. Instead, vetoing is a way to convey negative information about the proposal. When negative signals are precise enough, veto rights improve information aggregation.
Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature on framing that builds on Tversky and Kahneman (1981) . Applications to political science have shown, for example, that the outcome of a vote can be a¤ected by the ordering on the ballots (Miller and Krosnick, 1998) , the use of core-value electoral platforms (Brewer, 2001) or the emphasis in the initiatives'titles (Bütler and Maréchal, 2007) . We contribute to this strand of literature by focusing on equivalency framing e¤ ects, which studies how di¤erent logically equivalent frames a¤ect choices (see Druckman, 2001) . A typical strategy in these studies is to frame the same problem in terms of gains or losses. What we do is di¤erent in that we manipulate actions'focality. Moreover, we do this in a strategic environment, in which, to a certain extent, sophisticated agents are able to compensate the actions of the agents that are a¤ected by the frame.
Theory

The Model
A group of n 3 agents (with n odd) 6 must vote over two possible alternatives, Blue and Red.
Information structure. There are two states of nature, ! 2 f! B ; ! R g, which materialize with equal probability. The actual state of nature is not observable, but each agent privately observes an imperfectly informative signal: either s B or s R (the blue or red signal, respectively). Conditional on the state of nature, the signals are independently drawn. The probability that an agent will observe signal s B is higher in state ! B than in state ! R ; and the converse is true for s R . We denote the probability of receiving signal s 6 That n is odd only simpli…es the exposition. in state ! by Pr (sj!) :
Preferences. Agents have common values: they all prefer decision Red in state ! R and Blue in state ! B . 7 We capture this with the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
Voting systems. The group makes a decision by taking a simultaneous vote. We mainly focus on two voting systems: Majority with Veto power (V ) and Unanimity (U ). A voting system 2 fU; V g is de…ned as a set of possible actions A and an aggregation rule d that maps agents'actions into a group decision: d : fa 2 A g n ! fBlue; Redg. We denote by X a the total number of agents playing action a. Agents do not communicate before making their decision. 8
The group decision is Blue if and only if no one plays v and there is a majority that plays b. The decision is Red otherwise. Hence, we interpret b as a vote for Blue, r as a vote for Red, and v as a veto ("against Blue"). To highlight the di¤erences and similarities between the voting systems, it is convenient to de…ne Unanimity using the same aggregation rule as in the de…nition above (d V ) and to label the di¤erent actions in a similar fashion. 7 Assuming that all agents behave strategically, the potential presence of agents that prefer the status quo for private reasons neither a¤ects the comparison of unanimous rules nor the behavior of common value agents (Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe 2016). 8 This assumption is not innocuous. In our setup, if communication were allowed, full information sharing would be possible under both Unanimity and Veto (i.e. there would exist an equilibrium in which agents truthfully reveal their information at the communication stage and the revealed information is used to reach an optimal decision at the voting stage). However, this appealing feature disappears when agents di¤er Strategy and equilibrium concept. Formally, we de…ne an agent's strategy as a function : fs B ; s R g ! 4 (A ) : In particular, a (s) denotes the probability with which an agent who receives signal s plays a. Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), we focus on responsive symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. 9 
Equilibrium Analysis and Welfare Properties
In Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe (2016), we characterize the equilibrium under Veto and prove welfare results in a more general version of the model. 10 A key aspect of the welfare analysis is that unanimous rules should be compared according to their information aggregation properties. To do so, we can rely here on the concept of right decision.
De…nition 3
The right decision maximizes agents'expected utility given the realized signal pro…le. A voting system is e¢ cient if it leads to the right decision always being taken.
What the right decision is depends on the number of signals of each color, and on their relative precision. When the information structure is su¢ ciently biased, it can be the case that a single red signal is decisive. 11
De…nition 4
We say that a red signal is decisive if, unless all signals are blue, the right decision is Red (i.e. keeping the status quo).
In the experiment, we consider a case where a red signal is decisive, and a case where it is not. In this section, we formally state the relevant theoretical results on which our 9 In our context, a responsive pro…le is such that (i) at least some agents play action b with positive probability, and (ii) not all of them play b with probability 1. This ensures that, in equilibrium, some pivot probabilities are strictly positive and agents a¤ect the outcome of the vote with positive probability. 1 0 That is, we consider all admissible parameters and we allow for the presence of private value agents.
hypotheses are based, and we brie ‡y discuss why we chose these cases. We do not repeat the proofs in this paper, but we give the details of where to …nd them in Appendix A2.
Baseline case: a red signal is not decisive
The baseline case is the most interesting. In the corresponding parameter region, we have chosen to focus on signals that are equally informative. This corresponds to the case originally studied by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and then taken to the laboratory by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) . Comparing our experimental results to theirs o¤ers a simple robustness check in terms of subject behavior.
Unanimity admits a unique equilibrium:
Veto admits two equilibria, one in pure strategies: b (s B ) = r (s R ) = 1, and one in mixed strategies, which are equivalent to those in the equilibrium under Unanimity.
As Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) have shown, it is not an equilibrium under Unanimity for agents to play b with a blue signal and v with a red signal. This is because agents are only pivotal when all other agents play b. Under this strategy, that would imply that they all have received a blue signal, which gives a strong incentive to disregard one's red signal and play b instead. This is why, in equilibrium, agents with a red signal mix (probability is such that they are indi¤erent between playing b and v).
Under Veto, there are two equilibria. In the pure strategy equilibrium, agents simply play the color of their signal. Doing so, the group always makes the right decision. Hence, there is no reason to deviate. The second equilibrium mimics that under Unanimity. If no other agent ever plays r, playing r becomes strategically equivalent to playing b; a single vote for Red (instead of Blue) cannot change the group decision.
Our welfare criterion is an agent's expected utility. Given that agents equally dislike both types of errors, it corresponds to the ex-ante probability to make the right decision.
if agents coordinate on the pure strategy equilibrium under Veto, they make the right decision with a strictly higher probability than under Unanimity;
if agents coordinate on the mixed strategy equilibrium under Veto, the two systems are welfare equivalent.
Under Veto, the mixed strategy equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the pure strategy one, and it is also unstable. 12 This is why we see it as a less credible predictor of agents behavior. Beside comparing the realized welfare properties of Veto and Unanimity, running the experiment o¤ers us an empirical test of such an equilibrium selection prediction. To this purpose, running a control treatment under simple majority rule o¤ers a natural benchmark for such a test because, in its unique equilibrium, strategies are equivalent to the pure strategy equilibrium under Veto. 13 That Veto strictly dominates Unanimity extends to any biased signal structures as long as the red signal is not decisive. Note however that the Pareto dominant equilibrium may then include mixed strategies. 14 
Extreme case: a red signal is decisive
When the red signal is decisive, Veto no longer strictly dominates Unanimity. Under both rules, it is a weakly dominant strategy for agents with red signals to play v. Taking this into account, agents with blue signals optimally choose to play b, and the group always makes the right decisions.
Lemma 2 If a red signal is decisive, Veto and Unanimity admit a unique equilibrium
Proposition 2 If a red signal is decisive, Veto and Unanimity are welfare equivalent.
Even though they are welfare equivalent (they are both e¢ cient), Veto has a larger action set and, as we discuss below, the sincere action does not necessarily coincide with equilibrium strategies. This could undermine Veto's information aggregation properties. 1 2 If other agents with red signals play r with strictly positive probability, playing r or b are no longer strategic equivalent, and the equilibrium unravels. 1 3 See Appendix A1 for a formal de…nition and the catarachterisation of equilibrium. 1 4 This is similar to what happens under the simple majority rule.
Sincere voting and framing e¤ects
To analyze departures from strategic behavior, it is worth discussing the notion of "sincere voting", which is often used in the literature. In a related paper, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) describe sincere voting as "an individual's optimal voting decision based solely on her own private information". That is, agents vote sincerely if they select "the alternative yielding their highest expected payo¤ conditional on their own signal ".
In our setup, contrarily to theirs, such a de…nition of sincere voting does not nail down the agents' choice of action under Veto. If they receive a blue signal, playing b is the unambiguous sincere action. But, if they receive a red signal, there are two candidates for the sincere action as both playing r or v favors Red.
This ambiguity leaves the door open to di¤erent de…nitions. In the spirit of previous literature, we consider agents that are a¤ected by the focality of an action's label -i.e., the focal action for decision Red is r. 15 Given the way we have de…ned Veto, this corresponds to a vote for Red. But it is also possible to frame the voting system in such a way that playing r amounts to vetoing Blue.
This frame is unanimity rule under the constructive abstention regime (Constructive Abstention), which we formalize as follows. 16 De…nition 5 Voting system "Constructive Abstention" is de…ned by:
where A CA = fb; c; rg and
Under Constructive Abstention, agents can play b, c, or r, and the group decision is
Blue if and only if (i) no one plays r and (ii) more agents play b than c. This system is strategically equivalent to Veto, in the sense that it also has three possible actions and the aggregation rule is equivalent. They only di¤er in their labeling (c and r correspond respectively to r and v under Veto; b does not change). Hence, playing r corresponds to vetoing under Constructive Abstention, whereas it is a vote for Red under Veto. 17 Since 1 5 An alternative de…nition would be that sincere voters vote for the strongest action that favors their most preferred outcome (based on their own information). Here, this would correspond to playing v when receiving a red signal. 1 6 We named this system after the notion of constructive abstention introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). 1 7 To avoid confusion, we will stick to the terminology "vote for Blue", "vote for Red", "veto".
r is now the focal action corresponding to the red signal, we have that sincere agents do veto when they receive it (they still vote for Blue with a blue signal). Hence, while Veto and Constructive Abstention lead to identical outcomes in our strategic voting model, this will not necessarily be the case in the presence of sincere agents.
First, consider the baseline case. Since sincere actions and equilibrium strategies are the same under Veto, the presence of sincere agents is therefore inconsequential. This is not true, however, under Constructive Abstention because these agents use their veto, which is ine¢ cient. This said, it is important to note that sincere agents'impact on welfare depends on the ability of strategic agents to adjust their strategies so that the group behavior resembles the optimal one (we refer to this mechanism as compensation). Each time the game was played, one of the jars was randomly selected with equal probability by the computer. The subjects were not told which jar had been selected, but they were privately shown a ball randomly and independently drawn from the selected jar.
Hence, a blue ball corresponds to s B and a red ball corresponds to s R . After seeing their ball, the subjects had to vote. The possible votes and the aggregation rule varied across treatments.
If the group decision matched the color of the jar, the payo¤ for all members of the group was 100 talers. Otherwise, it was 10 talers.
We had two treatment variables, which led to a 2 4 design and eight di¤erent treatments. The …rst variable was the voting rule. We experimented using the four voting rules described above: Veto (V), Unanimity (U), Majority (M), and Constructive Abstention (CA). Their framing was the following. To vote, subjects had to click a button of their choice. In V treatments, subjects had to choose among blue; red; and veto: If a subject vetoed, the group decision was the Red jar. If nobody vetoed, the group decision was the jar whose color had received the most votes (in a language that can be common to our four voting systems, we refer to these actions as voting for Blue, voting for Red and vetoing, respectively). In U treatments, subjects had to choose between blue and red. The group decision (that is, the jar that was selected by aggregating the votes) was Blue if and only if all subjects chose blue (these actions correspond to voting for Blue and vetoing). In M treatments, subjects also had to choose between blue and red, but the group decision was the jar whose color had received the most votes (these actions correspond to voting for Blue and voting for Red). In CA treatments, subjects had to choose between blue, abstain, and red. If a subject chose red, the group decision was the Red jar. If nobody chose red, the group decision was the Blue jar, as long as there were more votes for Blue than abstentions (these actions correspond to voting for Blue, voting for Red and vetoing, respectively).
The second variable that varied across treatments was the information structure -the likelihood of getting the right signal in either state. In Setting 1 (the baseline case), this likelihood was the same in both states:
In Setting 2 (the extreme case), signal precision di¤ered. In fact, the red signal was decisive: Pr (s B j! B ) = 0:99 and Pr (s R j! R ) = 0:3.
We ran six sessions for each treatment. Each session consisted of 50 rounds played by the same 18 subjects. In each round, these subjects were randomly split into two groups of 9, and the game was played separately in each group. Table 1 provides an overview of the di¤erent treatments. All experimental sessions were organized along the same procedure: subjects received detailed written instructions, which an instructor read aloud (see Appendix A5). Before starting the experiment, students were asked to answer a questionnaire to con…rm their full understanding of the experimental design. After the questionnaire, subjects began to play. At the end of each round, each subject received the following information: (i) the jar that was selected by the computer, (ii) the group decision, (iii) the number of votes for each alternative, and (iv) their payo¤ for that period.
To determine payment at the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selected …ve periods; the total amount of talers earned in these periods was converted to euros with a conversion rate of 0.025. In total, subjects earned an average of 12.99e, including a show-up fee of 3e.
Equilibrium Predictions and Alternative
Equilibrium strategies. Sincere voting. As explained above, the sincere voting hypothesis assumes that subjects vote for the action that corresponds to their signal color. Note that this implies identical predictions in the baseline and extreme cases. Table 3 summarizes the predictions.
Experiment: Results and Analysis
The main purpose of this section is to present our empirical analysis of the dominance of Veto over Unanimity. First, we compare average payo¤s and information aggregation scores. Second, we delve into subject behavior to assess whether the results can be attributed to the di¤erences in behavior predicted by the model and/or by the sincere voting hypothesis. We …rst consider the baseline case and then the extreme one. we exploit the framing e¤ects (Veto versus Constructive Abstention) to push further the analysis of sincere voting.
All the non-parametric tests we refer to are two-sided and use averages at the matching group level as their unit of analysis. To allow for learning in the initial periods, we focus on the second half of the experiment. That is, we present in the main text our analysis of rounds 26 to 50. 18 Our statements about statistical signi…cance are at the 10% con…dence level. Unless stated explicitly, they also holds for the whole 50 rounds. Figure 1 : Information aggregation score in treatments V1, U1 and M1. p = 0:004), 19 which provides strong support for the hypothesis that Veto strictly dominates Unanimity in this case. In contrast, payo¤s under Veto and Majority are very close (and not statistically di¤erent: Mann-Whitney, z = 0:081, p = 0:935).
Information aggregation. Ultimately, we are interested in whether the right decisions are taken. A simple way to assess this is to look at all the cases where the realized signal pro…le includes a given number of balls of each color (say, for instance, 6 blue and 3 red) and compute the proportion of times that the group made the right decision (Blue in this example) in these cases. There is, however, a caveat; there are very few observations for some signal pro…le realizations (for instance, 9 blue, 0 red), which can give us a noisy picture. To circumvent this issue, we simulated 10,000 group decisions for each possible number of blue balls received in a group based on actual individual behavior (see Appendix A4 for details). With these, we computed an information aggregation score, that corresponds to the proportion of decisions that were right. Under Unanimity: (i) the model predicts poor information aggregation, and (ii) the sincere voting hypothesis predicts even worse information aggregation on average, but no mistake when there is a majority of red balls (i.e., there is no type I error -or in the jury interpretation, an innocent is not convicted). First, we …nd that when there is a majority of red balls, there are almost no mistakes. This is very close to the sincere voting outcome, but it stands in sharp contrast to the model prediction (about a 10 to 20% mistake rate depending on the ball draw). However, when there is a majority of blue balls, there are many more mistakes than what the model predicts (for example, only 4% of decisions are right with 5 blue balls, compared to more than 30% according to the model). In fact, the realized information aggregation score lies between the model prediction and sincere voting (except for 9 blue balls), closer to sincere voting.
In line with the theoretical prediction, we …nd that Veto does aggregate information better than Unanimity. When there are 5 blue balls or more, the di¤erence is economically large, and statistically signi…cant. 20 When there is a majority of red balls, both systems have close-to-perfect scores. 21 This means that the gains from using Veto instead of Unanimity essentially materialize through a drastic reduction of errors of type II (i.e. false negatives such as not adopting a good reform, or acquitting a guilty defendant).
To assess the absolute performance of Veto, it is useful to compare it to Majority (M1, right panel), which is well known for its good information aggregation properties (at least in this case). We can see that Veto does almost as well as Majority. The only signi…cant di¤erence occurs with 6 blue balls and more, where Majority does slightly better.
Behavior. Can the dominance of Veto over Unanimity be attributed to the predicted di¤erences in behavior? To answer this question, it is helpful to delve further in the comparison between Veto and Majority. Under both Veto and Majority, the model predicts that agents play the color of their ball -blue if they receive a blue signal and red if they receive a red signal. We …nd that subject behavior is fairly close to this (they play accordingly 96% and 94% of the time, respectively). These average frequencies are remarkably close to what we observe under Majority. They are not signi…cantly di¤erent (Mann-Whitney, z = 1:121, p = 0:262 both for red and blue signals). However, while the proportion of deviations is almost identical under the two systems, the deviations themselves are di¤erent. Even though they do not generate signi…cant di¤erences in overall average payo¤, it provides an explanation for why Veto gets a slightly lower information aggregation score than Majority when there is a majority of blue balls. A veto in such cases is indeed very likely to overturn the right decision that would have otherwise been made by the majority of non-vetoing players. Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to the number of subjects who played at those frequencies: the larger this number, the bigger the circle. We can see that the vast majority of subjects always play as predicted (84% Figure 2 : Individual behavior in treatments V1 and M1. Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to the observed frequence of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually adopted that frequence of play. The red circle represents the average frequency of play observed, the orange triangle represents the symmetric equilibrium prediction and the green diamond represents the sincere voting prediction. three possible actions. To facilitate comparison, we abstract from cases where subjects vetoed (which corresponds to less than 2% of total votes). That is, we report frequencies conditional on playing r or b. 22 Overall, the picture is remarkably similar to that of Majority: a vast majority of subjects always vote as predicted (79% of total votes).
To sum up, both at the aggregate and the individual level, behavior under Veto is remarkably in line with that under Majority, and arguably pretty close to the model predictions. We interpret these as a reasonable validation of our equilibrium selection assumption, and as being consistent with the hypothesis that predicted behavior is driving the good information aggregation performance. Note, however, that equilibrium strategies correspond here to the sincere actions. We will return to this issue in Section 4.2.
Now consider what happens under Unanimity. As we can see in Table 5 , subjects massively vote for Blue when they receive a blue signal (92%), which is the action predicted by the model (and by the sincere voting hypothesis). However, when they receive a red signal, they veto (i.e., they play r under Unanimity) 47% percent of the times, which is substantially higher than the model prediction (23% Figure 3 : Individual behavior in treatment U1. Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to the observed frequency of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually adopted that frequency of play. The red circle represents the average. and Yariv (2011). Overall, there is a larger proportion of votes that are not in line with the model prediction. Since these deviations lean toward a higher proportion of veto, this o¤ers a natural interpretation for why Unanimity generates almost no errors of type I and many more errors of type II than predicted.
Figure 3 depicts individual behavior under Unanimity. Here subjects cannot vote for
Red. Accordingly, the vertical axis gives the frequency at which agents with a red signal veto. We …nd that most agents with a blue signal vote for Blue a majority of the time.
However, there are a number of subjects that sometimes veto when they receive a blue ball. This is not easy to rationalize, but given that the group decision is most often Red anyway, this is not necessarily costly (in the sense that the subject is unlikely to be pivotal). 23 We observe two opposite subject clusters for red signals. Some (31%) always veto in that case. Others (41%) always vote for Blue. A possible interpretation is that agents specialize instead of mixing. Another is that some agents vote sincerely (i.e., veto) and the others compensate. A conclusion one could draw from this latter interpretation is that there are too many subjects playing sincerely (and the others cannot fully compensate), which drives the redistribution of errors towards type II and an overall performance that is poorer than that predicted by the model. 24 Before delving further in the issue of sincere voting, we now turn to the extreme case.
Extreme case
Payo¤s. In the extreme case, the model predicts identical outcomes under Veto and Unanimity. Table 6 displays realized and predicted average payo¤s in this case. We …nd that average payo¤ is higher under Unanimity than under Veto (13% of mistakes compared to 10%), but this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant (Mann-Whitney, z = 1:046, p = 0:295). The table also reports the results for Majority, which does much and signi…cantly less well (Mann-Whitney, z = 2:822, p = 0:005, for the comparison with Veto). 25 Information aggregation scores. Figure 4 displays information aggregation scores.
Experiment Model predictions Sincere voting
Here, the right decision is Blue if and only if all the balls are blue.
We …nd close to perfect information aggregation under both Veto and Unanimity. Most (of the overall few) mistakes happen when there are many blue balls. When there are 5, Behavior. Table 7 displays the voting frequencies in the extreme case. First, under Veto, note that 84% of the subjects that received a red signal did not vote for Red (the sincere action) but decided to veto instead, which is in line with strategic behavior. Still, we observe more departures from the model prediction than in the baseline case. For both signals, a striking 12% of agents vote for Red (the model predicts 0% Figure 5 : Individual behavior in treatments V2 and U2. Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to the observed frequence of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually adopted that frequence of play. The red circle represents the average frequency of play observed, the orange triangle represents the symmetric equilibrium prediction and the green diamond represents the sincere voting prediction.
could re ‡ect strategic compensation for those with a red ball who do not veto. Finally, under Majority, 33% of agents with a blue signal voted for Red. This is strikingly close to the model prediction (34%).
Let us now compare individual behavior under Veto and Unanimity (see Figure 5 ). To facilitate such a comparisons we abstract, for V2, from the action that is further away from the model prediction (i.e., playing b with a red signal and playing v with a blue signal) and
is indeed played at a very low frequency. On the vertical axis, we display the frequency at which v is played conditional on r or v being played, and on the horizontal axis we display the frequency of b conditional on b or r. 26 Under Unanimity, model predictions and sincere voting coincide. We …nd that a very large fraction of agents always act accordingly (i.e., their behavior corresponds to the top right corner). Still, a non-negligible fraction of agents vote for Blue with a red ball, which is not consistent with equilibrium behavior or sincere voting. This is the main reason for the type II errors one observes when there are 7 or 8 blue balls (see Figure 4 ).
Under Veto, we …nd more heterogeneity in behavior than in the baseline case. The behavior of only a very few subjects is consistent with sincere voting (they are on the Figure 6 : Individual behavior in treatment M2. Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to the observed frequence of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually adopted that frequence of play. The red circle represents the average bottom right corner): only 4% of subjects consistently vote sincerely. Still, a substantial proportion of agents do not veto when they receive a red signal (even though this is a weakly dominant strategy). We also observe a number of subjects that always veto with a red ball but that mix with a blue ball. This behavior is consistent with compensating behavior.
Finally, under Majority, agents overwhelmingly vote red when they receive a red ball.
With a blue ball, behavior seems consistent with at least two interpretations: some degree of specialization (instead of randomization according to the model symmetric equilibrium) and/or some sincere voting with countervailing compensation. On average, voting frequencies are almost spot on the equilibrium prediction.
To sum up, we …nd more departures from the model prediction than in the baseline case. Some are consistent with sincere voting (12% vote for Red with a red signal under Veto, for instance) and some are not (10 % vote for Blue with a red signal under Unanimity). However, the performances are barely a¤ected in terms of average payo¤ or information aggregation. The key reason for this is that most departures consist of voting
for Blue or Red (as opposed to veto). These deviations impair information aggregation but do not preclude it: since these actions do not nail down the group decision, it is still possible that the right decision will be made by the group. Hence, they can be interpreted as noise that slightly a¤ects average payo¤. Now, an interesting question arises: what would happen if sincere voting implied exerting one's veto power?
Sincere Voting and Framing E¤ects
As explained in Section 2.2.3, Constructive Abstention is strategically equivalent to Veto but its labeling makes vetoing the sincere action for agents with a red signal. In this section, we exploit this framing di¤erence to explore how the presence of sincere agents a¤ects outcomes and welfare. Table 8 displays the payo¤s. First, we …nd that Veto strongly and signi…cantly dominates Constructive Abstention in the baseline case (Mann-Whitney, z = 2:892, p = 0:004), which is consistent with the presence of sincere agents. Looking at information aggregation scores (see Figure 7 ) tells us that this comes from the cases with 5 blue balls or more, where the di¤erence is economically strong and statistically signi…cant. 27 This suggests that the impossibility for strategic voters to compensate a veto exerted by a sincere agent is indeed relevant. We also …nd that Constructive Abstention does not do signi…cantly better then Unanimity (Mann-Whitney, z = 0:326, p = 0:744). In fact, Constructive Abstention's information aggregation scores are very similar to those of Unanimity. 28 Rather than the impossibility for strategic agents to compensate, it may then be that the reason (and Unanimity), but the di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant. 29 Note that information aggregation scores (Figure 7 ) in V2 and CA2 are also very close (the small di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant). This is interesting, because, in the presence of sincere agents, we would expect Constructive Abstention to do better than Veto. This raises a series of questions: is sincere voting under Veto in this case less prevalent than under Constructive abstention in the baseline case? Is it that strategic agents are able to compensate? Is it linked to strategic uncertainty or equilibrium uniqueness? Inspecting voting behavior will help us partially answer these questions.
Payo¤s and information aggregation.
Baseline case
Behavior and interpretation.
Baseline case Voting frequencies under V1 and CA1 are very di¤erent (see Table 9 ).
The key points to note are the following. Among agents with a red ball, while 28% veto in CA1 (where it is the sincere action) only 2% do so in V1 (where it is not). In CA1, we also have that 10% of subjects with a red ball vote for Blue (this is the natural compensating action), and that 16% with a blue ball did not vote for Blue. 30 Finally, the di¤erence in voting behavior between CA1 and U1 is hardly consistent with subjects coordinating on the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. We can therefore rule out such an hypothesis. There is some clustering around the top right corner, which corresponds to the sincere actions. But this is far from overwhelming as this represents only 6% of the subjects (though this number grows to 10% if we look at agents that choose the sincere actions at least 80% of the times with both signals). Overall, we observe very dispersed behavior.
Still, even in low proportion, sincere voting can help explain why CA1 fails to aggregate information better than U1. This is because a veto nails down the group decision. In other words, there is no way for strategic agents to compensate.
Extreme case
We can compare this to what happens in the extreme case. First, in V2, 12% of subjects with a red ball vote for Red (the sincere action). Furthermore, under CA2, 6% of subjects with a red ball also vote for Red (not the sincere action). And, …nally, inspecting individual behavior (see Figure 8 ) one can hardly argue in favor of a clustering in the corresponding low-right corner (there are 4 subjects that always choose the sincere action, though). In any case, the proportion of votes that can appear to be sincere in V2 is much lower than in CA1 (recall that 28% subjects with a red ball veto in that case). 31 Assuming these do indeed re ‡ect sincere voting, this raises the question of why it is more prevalent in CA1 than in V2.
di¤erence in expected payo¤ of one's own action is low. 3 1 The di¤erence seems much smaller in the …rst half of the experiment. In particular, among agents with red balls, 25% that vote for Red in V2 and 31% veto in CA1. Learning seems therefore stronger under in V2. Figure 8 : Individual behavior in V and CA treatments. Each hollow circle on the graph corresponds to the observed frequency of play; its size represents the number of subjects who actually adopted that frequency of play. The red circle represents the average frequency of play observed, the orange triangle represents the symmetric equilibrium predictions and the green diamond represents the sincere voting prediction.
It has been established in other contexts that framing can a¤ect choices between options. For instance, the insight that people are more likely to select a default option has revolutionized retirement savings in the US (many companies now o¤er their employee the option to opt out instead of having to opt in). In the Decision Theory literature, such bias has been related to the concept of decision avoidance, which is relevant to our …ndings if one interprets the focal action in our experiment as the default option.
Decision avoidance means that "[the default option] may be chosen in order to avoid a di¢ cult decision" (Dean, Kibris, and Masatlioglu 2014; see also Tversky and Sha…r 1992) . 32 For instance, Dean (2009) …nds that subjects facing larger choice sets are more likely to select the default option. Applied to our context, this leads to the hypothesis that agents are more likely to choose the focal action (i.e., vote sincerely) if they face a more complex situation. Our …ndings are consistent with such an hypothesis, assuming that subjects …nd the extreme-case game less complex than the baseline one. This perceived complexity level could be due to the fact that the former presents a weakly dominant strategy and an obvious best response (even though computing the posterior involves nontrivial calculations), whereas the latter does not (here, no calculation is really needed if one understands the logic behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem). Strategic uncertainty, or complexity, may therefore also play a role for the di¤erence in behavior we have observed across the two frames.
Conclusion
Our main …nding is that Veto dominates Unanimity in the laboratory. We therefore provide empirical support for our previous theoretical results ( 
Non-parametric tests on Mistakes
Setting 1 Setting 2 U V CA U V CA M < z = 2:898 p = 0:004 = z = 0:081 p = 0:935 < z = 2:892 p = 0:004 > z = 2:898 p = 0:004 > z = 2:822 p = 0:005 > z = 2:415 p = 0:016 U > z = 2:898 p = 0:004 = z = 0:493 p = 0:622 = z = 1:046 p = 0:295 = z = 1:376 p = 0:168 V < z = 2:892 p = 0:004 = z = 0:243 p = 0:808 Table 12 : Mann-Whitney tests on the average realized information aggregation in the second half of the experiment. The sign > (<) indicates that the amount of mistakes in the 'row'voting rule are strictly higher (lower) than the one in the 'column'voting rule. = indicates that there are no signi…cant di¤erences. The only comparision which changes when considering all periods is U vs A in Setting 2: U does signi…canlty better in that case.
Appendix A4. Methodology for the simulations
A simple way to do this would be to compute the proportion of right decisions that would make a group if all 9 subjects would adopt strategies that match voting frequencies.
However, this would miss the point that heterogenous behavior can a¤ect outcomes. This is why we base our measure of information aggregation on individual voting frequencies.
Here is how we do. We …rst compute individual voting frequencies for each subject based on the last 25 periods. 33 Then, for each possible realized signal pro…le (i.e. for each number of blue balls going from 0 to 9), we run 10,000 simulations where members of a matching group (i.e. subjects in a session) are divided into two random groups and randomly assigned the di¤erent signals. For each of these simulations we aggregate votes and compute the outcomes. Finally, we pool the results by treatment and compute the proportion of group decisions that coincide with that of the fully informed dictator.
Appendix A5. Instructions
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please read these instructions very carefully. It is important that you do not talk to other participants during the entire experiment. In case you do not understand some parts of the experiment, please read through these instructions again. If you have further questions after hearing the instructions, please give us a sign by raising your hand out of your cubicle. We will then approach you in order to answer your questions personally. Please do not ask anything aloud.
During this experiment you will earn money. How much you earn depends partly on your own decisions, partly on the decisions of other participants, and partly on chance. Your personal earnings will be paid to you in cash as soon as the experiment is over. Your payo¤s during the experiment will be indicated in Talers. At the end of the instructions we are going to explain you how we are going to transform them into euros.
After the experiment, we will ask you to complete a short questionnaire, which we need for the statistical analysis of the experimental data. The data of the questionnaire, as well as all your decisions during the experiments will be anonymous.
The experiment you are participating in is a group decision making experiment. The experiment consists of 50 rounds. The rules are the same for all rounds and for all participants. At the beginning of each round you will be randomly assigned to a group of 9 participants (including yourself). You will not know the identity of the other participants. In each round you will only interact with the participants in your group. Your group will make a decision based on the vote of all group members. (important to say this here, because we say "before voting"later) The decision is simply a choice between two jars, the blue jar and the red jar. In what follows we will explain to you the procedure in each round.
The Jar. There are two jars: the blue jar and the red jar. The blue jar contains 7 blue balls and 3 red balls. The red jar contains 7 red balls and 3 blue balls. At the beginning of each round, one of the two jars will be randomly selected. We will call this the selected jar. Each jar is equally likely to be selected, i.e., each jar is selected with a 50% chance. You will not be told which jar has been chosen when making your decision.
The Sample Ball. Before voting, each of you receives a piece of information that may or may not help you decide which is the correct jar. After a jar is selected for your group, the computer will show each of the participants in your group (including yourself) the color of one ball randomly drawn from that jar. We will call this ball your sample ball. Since you are 9 in your group, the computer separately performs this random draw 9 times. Each ball will be equally likely to be drawn for every member of the group. That is, if the color of the selected jar for your group were red, then all members of your group would draw their sample balls from a jar containing 7 red and 3 blue balls. If the color of your group's jar were blue, then all members of your group would draw their sample balls from a jar containing 3 red and 7 blue balls. Therefore, if the selected jar is blue, each member of your group has a 70% chance of receiving a blue ball. And if the selected jar is red, each member of your group has a 70% chance of receiving a red ball.
You will only see the color of your own sample ball. This will be the only information you will have when you vote.
Your Vote. Once you have seen the color of your sample ball, you can vote. [Treatment M & U] You must vote for one of the two jars. That is, you must vote for Blue or vote for Red.
[Treatment CA] You must either vote for one of the two jars or abstain. That is, you must vote for Blue, vote for Red or Abstain.
[Treatment V] You must either vote for one of the two jars or veto the blue jar. That is, you must vote for Blue, vote for Red or Veto Blue.
Information at the end of each Round. Once you and all the other participants have made your choices, the round will be over. At the end of each round, you will receive the following information about the round: Final Earnings. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select 5 rounds and you will earn the payo¤s you obtained in these rounds. Each of the 50 rounds has the same chance of being selected. The total number of talers accumulated in these 5 selected rounds will be transformed into euros by multiplying your earnings in talers by a conversion rate. For this experiment the conversion rate is 0.025, meaning that 100 talers equal 2.5 Euros. Additionally, you will earn a show-up fee of 3.00 Euros. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
